Between Governance and Independence: Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils in Serbia in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

Judicial and prosecutorial councils are widely regarded as key institutional mechanisms for safeguarding the independence and autonomy of the judiciary and prosecution services while ensuring effective governance and accountability. In Serbia, these bodies were established in 2009 following the adoption of the 2006 Constitution, with the aim of depoliticising appointment, promotion, and disciplinary procedures within the judiciary and prosecution system. Constitutional amendments adopted in 2022 and implemented through a new set of judicial laws in 2023 substantially reshaped the composition and competences of both the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council. However, further amendments to judicial legislation adopted in January 2026 have reopened the debate on the effectiveness of these councils in balancing two objectives: institutional governance and the protection of judicial and prosecutorial independence (autonomy). This article adopts a problem-oriented approach to examine whether the current institutional design and practice of judicial and prosecutorial councils in Serbia effectively contribute to the protection of independence and autonomy, or whether particular governance arrangements may undermine these aims. The analysis focuses on the legal framework and the councils’ practical functioning, assessing their composition, competences, and role in key decisions affecting the judiciary and prosecution services. The Serbian model is evaluated in light of relevant European standards, including opinions of the Venice Commission and other Council of Europe bodies, as well as comparative examples from European jurisdictions. On this basis, the article identifies structural and practical challenges that may constrain the councils’ capacity to safeguard independence while ensuring transparent and accountable governance of the justice system.